In this paper we explore whether recruiters prefer applicants who are relatively strong in the skills in which the recruiters themselves excel. We analyze evidence from all entry exams to the Spanish Judiciary held between 2003 and 2007, where applicants are randomly assigned across evaluation committees. We find that applicants who excel in the same dimensions as recruiters are significantly more likely to be hired. Our findings have important strategic implications for both public and private sector recruitment practices.
Introduction
What influences employers' hiring decisions? The answer to this question has been discussed in the economics, management and psychology literatures for several decades.
One issue that has attracted particular attention is the potential existence of a "similarto-me" effect. According to this idea, evaluators tend to select candidates who are sim- Less attention has been devoted to similarity in terms of skills. 1 In this paper we test for the existence of a similar-to-me effect in skills using evidence from a real labor market selection process: the Spanish entry exams to judge and prosecutor positions.
This selection process is of great importance both in terms of the number of candidates involved -about 4000 each year-and in terms of the relevance of the jobs at stake: successful candidates become judges or prosecutors for life. The structure of the selection process provides a convenient setup to test for the existence of a similar-to-me effect in skills. First, candidates take a qualifying multiple choice test. Then, successful candidates are randomly allocated across several evaluation committees and they are orally evaluated on their knowledge in several areas. The composition of committees varies in terms of the field of specialization of their members, and thus it allows us to 1 An exception is the work of Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) , who examine the election of Fellows of the Econometric Society. Conditional on several objective measures of quality, the field of specialization affects significantly the probability of election. In particular, theorists are more likely to be elected than econometricians. The authors hypothesize that a potential explanation for this result is that maybe theorists at high-prestige institutions make up a large fraction of the electorate and are happier to vote for candidates like themselves. study how the expertise of committee members affects selection decisions.
We find that recruiters tend to hire candidates that are relatively more similar to themselves in terms of their skills. In quantitative terms, we observe that committees whose knowledge of a field is above the median tend to hire candidates that are on average one tenth of a standard deviation more knowledgeable in that field -as measured by their performance in a preliminary multiple choice test.
Two types of hypothesis are consistent with the observed evidence. First, there might be a preference-based explanation. According to the similarity-attraction paradigm, there is a strong association between similarity to oneself and interpersonal attraction, and this association might affect selection decisions (Byrne 1971) . As Graves and Powell (1995, p. 86) put it, "perceived similarity in attitudes and values [which in turn] leads to interpersonal attraction between the recruiter and the applicant (...) then leads to positive bias in the recruiter's interview conduct." Similarly, the attractionselection-attrition theory (Schneider 1987) , one the main theoretical foundations of the person-organization fit literature, posits that organizations attract, select, and retain similar types of people. Second, the evidence may reflect the existence of information asymmetries about the real productivity of workers. As Cornell and Welch (1996, p. 544) point out, if it "is easier for individuals to screen people of similar background (...) people (will) tend to hire others of their own type even when they have no innate preference for similar people". While we are not able to disentangle between the two hypotheses, our results unambiguously suggest that evaluation committees should be balanced.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide background information about hiring procedures in the Spanish Judiciary. In section 3, we present the data and, in section 3, the empirical analysis. Finally, section 4 concludes and briefly discusses potential implications for the recruiting practices of firms.
3
In Spain, candidates to judge and prosecutor positions must pass a public examination at the national level. This selection process is held yearly for both positions jointly.
The structure of the process is as follows (see Table 1 ). 
Data
We have collected data from public exams to judge and prosecutor positions held in 
Candidates
Slightly less than half of the candidates who had initially registered for the exam passed the multiple choice test and, therefore, qualified for the first oral stage and were evaluated by committees. In Table 2 we show descriptive statistics on these candidates.
6
Around one third of candidates were male and a significant proportion, 19%, lived in Madrid at the time of the exam. Success rates are low: only 8% of candidates passing the multiple choice test managed to pass both oral tests and obtained the position (less than 4% of candidates who had originally registered). Unsuccessful candidates tend to retake the exam. In our sample nearly 60% of candidates had already taken the exam three or more times.
We proxy for candidates' knowledge of the first block (mainly Civil and Criminal Law) using the grade obtained in the preliminary qualifying multiple choice test where, as explained above, at least 80% of the questions belong to the first block. Since the same multiple choice test was taken by all candidates each year, this allows us to have a homogeneous measure of quality which is independent of evaluators' actions.
Unfortunately, a similar measure was not available for the second block of questions. Table 3 To provide an aggregate measure of the knowledge profile of evaluators, for each committee we have computed the proportion of professors, court secretaries, and judges who specialize in the main two subjects which are included in the first block (and therefore are evaluated in the first oral test, Civil and Criminal Law). 7 We call this variable evaluators' knowledge of first block. Approximately 64% of committee members that are professors, judges or court secretaries specialize in one of these topics (see Table 3 , last row). The remaining 36% are experts in subjects that belong to the second block of topics (and, therefore, are evaluated in the second oral test, Procedural, Administrative and Social Law).
Committees

Empirical analysis
Following the multiple choice test candidates are allocated to committees in a random way. Therefore, by construction, the characteristics of candidates who have been assigned to each committee are not related to evaluators' characteristics, including our variable of interest: evaluators' knowledge of first block. Our identification strategy exploits this fact. Any systematic variation across committees in the characteristics of candidates who are selected can be attributed to the effect of committee composition.
Our empirical analysis is structured as follows. First, we show that the allocation of candidates to committees was such that there is no significant correlation between candidates' and evaluators' characteristics. Then we explore the determinants of success in these public exams. We report results for the first and second oral stages and for the process as a whole. Finally, we analyze whether there is any relationship between the knowledge profile of evaluators and candidates' chances of success. In particular, 7 Court secretaries and judges that were assigned to a military court were not included in this measure, as Military Law is not evaluated in any of the oral exams.
we examine whether candidates that are knowledgeable in the first block of topics are more likely to be hired if they are evaluated by a committee which excels in those dimensions.
Is the assignment of candidates to committees truly random?
Candidates to judge and prosecutor positions are assigned to committees through a lottery which determines the surname initial to start the matching. Given the way the assignment is structured, there should not be any significant correlation between the characteristics of candidates and the composition of evaluation committees. We examine this issue in Table 4 . We cluster standard errors at the committee level to account for the fact that observations within a committee are not independent.
8 None of the observable committee characteristics -evaluators' knowledge of first block, age, gender composition or experience-is correlated with any of the observable characteristics of candidates -the grade obtained by candidates in the multiple choice test, their gender, their experience or their geographical origin-. Table 5 provides information about the grade obtained in the multiple choice test by candidates that were assigned to a committee whose knowledge of the first block of topics was above or equal to the median and for candidates who were assigned to a committee whose knowledge of the first block was below the median. As expected, the multiple choice grade is statistically similar across different committees (columns (1)- (3)).
The determinants of candidates' success
The following equation models the determinants of candidates' performance:
8 When the number of clusters is relatively small the consistency of the usual cluster-robust standard error estimator may not hold (Wooldridge 2003) . Given that we have only 27 committees, we bootstrap robust standard errors cluster at the committee level. These bootstrapped clustered standard errors are slightly larger than cluster-robust standard errors.
where subindex i stands for individual, j for stage, and t indicates the year when the exam was held. The dependent variable y is a dummy that indicates whether the candidate qualified, x is a vector of individual characteristics which includes the grade obtained by the candidate in the preliminary multiple choice test, gender, geographic origin, and how many times she has taken the exam before. For the sake of simplicity, the multiple choice test information has been normalized to have mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one. The inclusion of a vector of year dummies d captures any systematic variation over years in the quantity and quality of candidates or in the number of available positions. Finally, ε reflects any remaining unobservable factors that could affect candidates' success. Table 6 Results for the second oral stage are reported in column (3). Among candidates that make it to the second oral stage, those who had obtained a higher grade in the preliminary multiple choice test tend to be more successful, but the relationship is weaker than in the first oral stage. This is consistent with the fact that the multiple choice test covers mainly contents from the first block of topics. Additionally, more experienced candidates tend to perform relatively worse at this stage. Results for the 9 There is no clear consensus in the literature relative to the potential existence of a male advantage in the performance of fixed response tests vs constructed response tests. While several studies have found no significant gender differences (Walstad and Becker 1994, Greene 1997 10 
Similar-to-me in skills effect
We compare the knowledge profile of successful candidates across different types of committees. The evidence is consistent with the existence of a similar-to-me effect.
We observe that evaluators that are more knowledgeable in the first block of questions tend to hire candidates that also excel in this first block of topics (Table 5 , columns (4)- (6)). The magnitude of this difference is approximately equal to one tenth of a standard deviation and is statistically significant at the 5% level. In order to understand better the origin of these differences we examine how evaluators' knowledge profile affects hiring decisions using the following equation:
where c denotes the evaluation committee, variable k it represents candidates' knowledge of the first block, as proxied by the grade obtained in the preliminary multiple choice test, and k ct represents evaluators' knowledge of the first block. Note that, by construction, evaluators' knowledge of the first block is inversely related to evaluators' knowledge of the second block.
We observe that candidates that excel in the first block are more likely to pass the first stage if they are assigned to a committee that is relatively more knowledgeable in the first block, but the effect is small and it is not significantly different from zero (Table 6 , column (2)). In the second stage we also find that candidates that are knowledgeable in the first block have relatively higher chances of success if they are evaluated by a committee which is expert in the first block (or, equivalently, which is not knowledgeable in the second block). The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Note that, even though we cannot statistically reject that the effect is similar in the first and in the second stages, the analysis suggests that the effect mainly arises in the evaluation of the second block of topics. Candidates that excel in the first block of topics benefit from having a committee which is relatively knowledgeable in this block mostly because of their leniency in the second oral test, and not because they are favored in the first oral test. Finally, in column (6) we consider whether the candidate obtains the position. We find that candidates that are knowledgeable in the first block are significantly more likely to be hired if the committee is expert in the first block.
Robustness checks
We examine the robustness of our results in several ways. First, we explore an alternative specification. Using an interaction term involves making certain assumptions about the metrics of the variables and the functional form of the effect. We estimate equation (2) interacting the variable "multiple choice grade" with a dummy variable that takes value one if "evaluators's knowledge of the first block" is above or equal to the median. As shown in Table 7 , column (2), results are qualitatively very similar.
Second, we explore the possibility that results are driven by some omitted committee characteristic, which might be correlated with knowledge profile. We include in our regression committees' experience, age, and gender. (7) and (8)).
Conclusion
In this paper we explore whether recruiters prefer applicants who are relatively strong in the skills in which the recruiters themselves excel. We test this hypothesis using data from entry exams to judge and prosecutor positions in Spain. This selection process offers several convenient features. Candidates are randomly allocated to evaluation committees, which vary in terms of the field of specialization of their members. Thus, we are able to exploit the randomness of candidates' assignment to committees in order to estimate consistently the effect of committees' knowledge profile. The subjects and the evaluations are actually taken from real life, with successful candidates receiving very substantial payoffs. Hence, while we have a setting where candidates are randomly assigned to different treatments, the setup allows to avoid the usual problems associated with artificial settings.
The empirical evidence is consistent with the existence of a similar-to-me in skills effect. While the groups of candidates that were initially (randomly) allocated across committees were similar, we observe significant differences in the type of candidates that each committee hires. In particular, committees that are more knowledgeable in the topics that are evaluated in the first oral stage are more likely to hire candidates who excel in these topics.
A potential threat to the consistency of our results may exist if, following their assignment to a committee, candidates devote relatively more time to study those topics where they expect the committee to be more demanding. In this respect, our results have to be interpreted as a lower bound of the true level. 11 The lack of information about the knowledge profile of the private lawyer that sits in the committee can also affect the interpretation of our results. If private lawyers tend to be assigned to committees with a similar knowledge profile, our results might exhibit an upwards bias. If, on the contrary, private lawyers tend to be assigned to committees where their profile is relative scarce, our estimate would be a lower bound of the true effect.
Our results could be explained by the existence of differences in evaluators' objective functions. If some evaluators were biased in favor of certain dimensions, this might lead them to become specialized in those dimensions, and this would also be consistent with these individuals taking particularly into account those dimensions in their evaluations.
The evidence could also reflect some type of statistical discrimination. In the presence of information asymmetries, evaluators may pay more attention to signals in dimensions in which their evaluation is more accurate. If evaluators' accuracy is higher when evaluating those dimensions in which their knowledge is greater, 12 candidates who excel in the same dimensions as evaluators may have better chances of being hired (Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga 2008) . Unfortunately, our evidence does not allow us to test between these two potential explanations.
Our findings have important strategic implications for firms' recruitment practices.
Once a firm becomes relatively stronger in a certain dimension, it might have a tendency 11 Personal conversations with several candidates suggests that this actually might have happened in a number of cases. Such strategic behavior is severely limited by the brief time elapsed between the point at which candidates are allocated to committees and the time at which they are evaluated.
12 Several studies have found that in a number of fields poor performers are significantly worse at evaluating quality. The lower accuracy as evaluators of bad performers has been documented in fields such as chess (Chi 1978) , physics (Chi et al. 1982 ) and grammar (Kruger and Dunning 1999) .
to recruit candidates who excel in that dimension. As a result, firms' hiring decisions may have substantial long term effects. The potential dynamic consequences of a similar-to-me effect in hiring were also noted by Schneider (1987) , who argued that similarity "limits the actions of the organization owing to the fact that it occupies a constrained niche of like-minded employees sharing similar values, personalities and attitudes". Schneider calls this effect the "homogeneity hypothesis" and predicts that it may cause organizational dysfunctionality, as firms become increasingly ingrown and resistant to change. This grade is normalized with mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one for all candidates that passed the multiple choice test a given year. The number of observations is in brackets. Column (1) provides information for candidates that were assigned to a committee whose knowledge of the first block was above or equal to the median (0.60). Column (2) provides information for candidates that were assigned to a committee whose knowledge of the first block was below the median. Column (3) reports the p-value of a test on the equality of means, conditional on year. Columns (4), (5) and (6) report similar information for the sample of candidates that was hired. Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether the candidate passed the stage. The coefficients reported correspond to the marginal effects of a probit regression. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered by committee, are in parenthesis. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
